SoftHSM is an implementation of a cryptographic store accessible through a PKCS#11 interface. You can use it to explore PKCS#11 without having a Hardware Security Module. It is being developed as a part of the OpenDNSSEC project. SoftHSM uses Botan for its cryptographic operations.
Suricata is a network intrusion detection and prevention engine developed by the Open Information Security Foundation and its supporting vendors. The engine is multi-threaded and has native IPv6 support. It's capable of loading existing Snort rules and signatures and supports the Barnyard and Barnyard2 tools.
Whitepaper called What is a vulnerability assessment?
Arachni is a feature-full, modular, high-performance Ruby framework aimed towards helping penetration testers and administrators evaluate the security of web applications. Arachni is smart, it trains itself by learning from the HTTP responses it receives during the audit process. Unlike other scanners, Arachni takes into account the dynamic nature of web applications and can detect changes caused while travelling through the paths of a web application's cyclomatic complexity. This way attack/input vectors that would otherwise be undetectable by non-humans are seamlessly handled by Arachni.
Xplico is an open source Network Forensic Analysis Tool (NFAT) that allows for data extraction from traffic captures. It supports extraction of mail from POP, IMAP, and SMTP, can extract VoIP streams, etc. This is the version that has a GUI allowing you to view photos, texts and videos contained in MMS messages.
netsniff-ng is is a free, performant Linux network sniffer for packet inspection. The gain of performance is reached by 'zero-copy' mechanisms, so that the kernel does not need to copy packets from kernelspace to userspace. For this purpose netsniff-ng is libpcap independent, but nevertheless supports the pcap file format for capturing, replaying and performing offline-analysis of pcap dumps. netsniff-ng can be used for protocol analysis, reverse engineering and network debugging.
IPv6 offers a much larger address space than that of its IPv4 counterpart. The standard /64 IPv6 subnets can (in theory) accommodate approximately 1.844 * 10^19 hosts, thus resulting in a much lower host density (#hosts/#addresses) than their IPv4 counterparts. As a result, it is widely assumed that it would take a tremendous effort to perform host scanning attacks against IPv6 networks, and therefore IPv6 host scanning attacks have long been considered unfeasible. This document analyzes the IPv6 address configuration policies implemented in most popular IPv6 stacks, and identifies a number of patterns in the resulting addresses lead to a tremendous reduction in the host address search space, thus dismantling the myth that IPv6 host scanning attacks are unfeasible.