1. Advisory Information
Advisory URL: http://security.alibaba.com/blog/blog.htm?spm=0.0.0.0.p1ECc3&id=19
Date published: 2015-04-23
Date of last update: 2015-04-23

2. Vulnerability Information
Class: heap overflow
Impact: memory information leak and remote code execution
Remote Exploitable: Yes
Local Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2015-1863
Vulnerability Information and Patch: http://w1.fi/security/2015-1/

3. Vulnerability Description
　　In Android, wpa_supplicant is designed to be a "daemon" program that runs in the background and acts as the backend component controlling the wireless connection.. When WLAN Direct function of wpa_supplicant is enabled, a malformed p2p invitation type packet with long ssid can trigger a heap overflow vulnerability. An attacker could launch a remote attack in the wireless device signal coverage, access to the victim's android device and execute native code with the corresponding user privileges (in the android is wifi user). The user has permission to read the saved WIFI password, change network configuration, hijacking all Wi-Fi traffic. When combined with a local privilege escalation vulnerability that allows an attacker to remotely control a host of victims, implant Trojans and other underlying implant systems.
4. Vulnerable Packages
 Android 4/Android 5
 wpa_supplicant 2.x
5. Credits
Smart hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering the vulnerability.
6. Technical Description
 wpa_supplicant malloc a p2p_device structure, the oper_ssid field size of which is 0x20 bytes. In the p2p invitation packet the size of ssid field is described with an octet, the max of which is 0xff. When copy to oper_ssid field, the length is not checked. When the size of ssid exceeds 0x20 bytes, it can overflow other fields of the p2p_device structure and overflow heap structure when exceeds 0x40 bytes.
    In the android version 5.1, the source is:
============ p2p_device structure（ wpa_supplicant/p2p/p2p_i.h)============
struct p2p_device {
    [……….]
    int oper_freq;
    u8 oper_ssid[32];  <----- fixed 0x20 bytes 
    size_t oper_ssid_len;
       [……….]
    /**
    * go_neg_conf - GO Negotiation Confirmation frame
    */
    struct wpabuf *go_neg_conf;
    int sd_pending_bcast_queries;
};
=========（wpa_supplicant/p2p/p2p.c p2p_add_device ==============
int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq,
          struct os_reltime *rx_time, int level, const u8 *ies,
          size_t ies_len, int scan_res)
{
    [……….]
    if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
       os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
    if (msg.ssid &&
        (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
         os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
         != 0)) {
        os_memcpy(dev->oper_ssid, msg.ssid + 2, msg.ssid[1]);
//the dest buf is 0x20, but the size is controlled by user input, trigger buffer overflow 
       dev->oper_ssid_len = msg.ssid[1];
    }
[……….]
7. Vulnerability Impact Assessment：
    1）Affected product：Affect all devices of android version below 5.1 
    2）Default configuration exploitable analysis：Although much of android devices enable WLAN direct when user enters WLAN Direct UI, but: 
    We found some models of well-known mobile phone manufacturers (such as Xiaomi, Huawei), default to open the WLAN Direct. Even if the user 
never entered the WLAN Direct UI, the attacker can initiate a WLAN direct connection and trigger this vulnerability without user interaction. However, 
an attacker needs to know WLAN Direct MAC address, the address is the MAC address of user equipment with first byte OR 2, MAC address of the user 
equipment can acquire easily by WIFI packet sniffer, so you can calculate WLAN Direct MAC address, for example the user device MAC address 14: 12: 34: 56: 78: 90, 
then WLAN Direct MAC address is 16:12 : 34: 56: 78: 90, which means that some models of mobile phone, simply open the WIFI service, can suffer from the vulnerability attack.
　　For other models without WLAN Direct default enabled need to pay attention, because a lot of file transfer software use WLAN Direct feature and will enable it. 
And this feature once enabled, even if the user exits the WLAN Direct UI, the feature is enabled until the device reboot or WIFI restart. During this time the device is affected and can be attack remotely.
    3）Impact
    This vulnerability can leak information, use leaked information with ROP to bypass ASLR and DEP. Exploit this vulnerability successfully, attackers can execute
 native code with wifi user permission. Then with wifi user permission can change wifi configuration and hijack network traffic. 
    And this vulnerability can be exploited remotely, if composite a local privilege escalation vulnerability, attackers can implant trojan without physically touch victim devices. 
  So this vulnerability is high risk, especially for wlan direct enabled default devices. 
8. Poc and Coredump 
    See Advisory URL: http://security.alibaba.com/blog/blog.htm?spm=0.0.0.0.p1ECc3&id=19
9. Report Timeline
 2015-4-3：send vulnerability report to android security team
 2015-4-8：android security team acknowledges the vulnerability and forward it to wpa_supplicant maintainer
 2015-4-8：wpa_supplicant maintainer acknowledges
 2015-4-13：wpa_supplicant maintainer acknowledges timeline for release a fix
 2015-4-22：wpa_supplicant maintainer publish the fix and security advisory
 2015-4-23：The advisory is published