ImageMagick versions 6.2.8 and below suffer from a heap overflow in ReadSGIImage().
5950a0314acf70e0dd34e433fec8db1056c5f593a0011bb867946fcbe9014527
Overflow.pl Security Advisory #7
ImageMagick ReadSGIImage() Heap Overflow
Vendor: ImageMagick (http://www.imagemagick.org)
Affected version: 6.x up to and including 6.2.8
Vendor status: Fixed version released (6.2.9)
Author: Damian Put <pucik@overflow.pl>
URL: http://www.overflow.pl/adv/imsgiheap.txt
Date: 14.08.2006
1. Background
ImageMagick is a free software suite to create, edit, and compose bitmap images.
It can read, convert and write images in a large variety of formats.
http://www.imagemagick.org
2. Description
Remote exploitation of a heap overflow vulnerability could allow execution of
arbitrary code or couse denial of service.
A heap overflow exists in ReadSGIImage() function, that is used to
decode a SGI image file. The vulnerable code is:
coders/sgi.c:
static Image *ReadSGIImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
...
iris_info.bytes_per_pixel=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
...
image->columns=iris_info.columns;
image->rows=iris_info.rows;
...
bytes_per_pixel=(size_t) iris_info.bytes_per_pixel;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) iris_info.columns*iris_info.rows;
...
iris_pixels=(unsigned char *)AcquireMagickMemory
(4*bytes_per_pixel*iris_info.columns*iris_info.rows);
We can manipalute iris_info.rows, iris_info.columns and bytes_per_pixel
value. Allocation of memory to "iris_pixels" is based on this values.
When rows*cols*bytes_per_pixe*4 overflow integer variable, we can alloc not
enough memory for next operations, and cause heap overflow.
3. PoC
Example crafted SGI file: http://overflow.pl/poc/imheap.sgi
[pucik@overflow ImageMagick-6.2.8]$ display imheap.sgi
*** glibc detected *** free(): invalid next size (fast): 0x08055dd0 ***
Abort (core dumped)
[pucik@overflow ImageMagick-6.2.8]$