The parsing engine in ClamAV versions below 0.96 can be bypassed by manipulating CAB (Filesize) archives in a "certain way" that the ClamAV engine cannot extract the content but the end user is able to.
5b71b0644c8e2c68a39b65b1d09e406706b0f0049ebfe813efb8f19923797186
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From the low-hanging-fruit-department
Clamav generic evasion (CAB)
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Release mode: Coordinated but limited disclosure.
Ref : [TZO-43-2009] - Clamav generic evasion (CAB)
WWW : http://blog.zoller.lu/2009/05/advisory-clamav-generic-evasion-cab.html
Vendor : http://www.clamav.net &
http://www.sourcefire.com/products/clamav
Status : Patched (in version 0.95.2)
CVE : none provided
Security notification reaction rating : good
Disclosure Policy : http://blog.zoller.lu/2008/09/notification-and-disclosure-policy.html
Affected products :
- ClamAV below 0.96
Affected systems:
- MACOSX server,
- IBM Secure E-mail Express Solution for System
Others : http://www.clamav.net/about/who-use-clamav/
I. Background
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Quote: "Clam AntiVirus is an open source (GPL) anti-virus toolkit for UNIX,
designed especially for e-mail scanning on mail gateways. It provides
a number of utilities including a flexible and scalable multi-threaded
daemon, a command line scanner and advanced tool for automatic
database updates. The core of the package is an anti-virus engine
available in a form of shared library. "
II. Description
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The parsing engine can be bypassed by manipulating CAB (Filesize) archives
in a "certain way" that the Clamav engine cannot extract the content but
the end user is able to.
III. Impact
~~~~~~~~~~~
To know more about the impact and type of "evasion", I updated the
description at http://blog.zoller.lu/2009/04/case-for-av-bypassesevasions.html
IV. Disclosure timeline
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DD/MM/YYYY
Nothing particular too note.